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INTRODUCTION 
During the period from 2004 to 2006 Bosnia and Herzegovina made a significant step forward in its 
economic reforms by developing and establishing a single indirect taxation system, becoming one 
of 123 countries (Bird et al, 2001) around the world to adopt a value–added tax (VAT). This reform 
measure has brought about several key developments for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Firstly, the “self-
corrective” nature of VATs has enabled a boost in tax compliance, increasing the range of legal ent-
ities reporting on their business activities and paying taxes. Secondly, there has been a removal of 
tax from intermediate products, which is normally the case with retail sales taxes (RSTs), resulting 
in the expansion “of the tax base to include a wide range of services that, for the most part, were not 
subject to tax … thus [leading] to a considerable expansion in the range of consumption subject to 
tax” (Bird et al, 2001). For the budgets of the governments in Bosnia and Herzegovina this has lead 
to a surge in tax revenues on almost all levels (albeit temporarily, according to the International 
Monetary Fund – IMF estimates1). 
Institutionally, the introduction of the VAT has lead to the merging of entity customs administra-
tions into the Indirect Tax Authority (ITA), which is administered by the State of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, thus centralizing the collection, recording and allocation of indirect taxes (which include 
VAT, excises and other import and export related surcharges). Most importantly, VAT has intro-
duced an independent source of financing for the State institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
which were, until then, dependent on contributions from the entity levels. However, progress 
achieved thus far in this very important reform, as well as in the overall system, risks being under-
mined. The current system of allocation of indirect taxes between the State, entities (The Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska) and Brčko District governments is based on an 
assessment of relative proportion of final consumption, as reported by tax payers in tax returns. This 
basis for allocation and the way it is implemented in practice (via ad hoc decisions rather than 
                                                            
* This policy paper was written with the support of the Soros Open Society Fund of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Soros Open 
Society Fund of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
1 See the IMF country Report No. 07/268; June 2007.   
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standing regulations) is proving to be very problematic for several reasons, and has resulted in con-
stant political disputes, tensions and dissatisfactions2.  
During the Third Economic dialogues between the European Commission and Bosnia and Herzego-
vina held in Sarajevo on 17th October 2007, the (then) Chairman of the Managing Board of the ITA, 
Mr. Peter Nicoll, stressed this issue and stated that a permanent, or at least a more stable form of 
revenue allocation must be developed by the end of the year to avoid problems in year 3 in the im-
plementation of the indirect tax system in Bosnia and Herzegovina.3 Interestingly enough, for many 
other federal states (or supra-federations, like the European Union) the introduction of VAT has al-
so meant a “reshuffle” in revenue assignment and allocation between federal constituents (Bird et 
al, 2001).   
However, if one takes a broader perspective on this issue, the introduction of VAT, the centraliza-
tion of indirect taxes and their assignment to the State level of Bosnia and Herzegovina has, in fact, 
opened a new chapter in the development of sustainable federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ra-
ther than just looking at the narrow short-term issue of how much “piece of the VAT cake” each 
level should get, the role of  VAT, i.e. the indirect tax system, should be observed as an instrument 
for the forging of a more purposeful, rather than inadvertent, cohesion between each of the levels of 
government in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as introducing mechanisms to ensure public ex-
penditure efficiency and effectiveness. This paper aims to present a wider debate on the arrange-
ments of fiscal cohesion, partly by stressing the main areas of improvement in the current system, 
and partly by presenting relevant comparative experience of other federal countries in this area.  
 
THE INDIRECT TAXATION SYSTEM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
Institutional Arrangements 
The reform of the indirect tax system in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a gradual process. Before 
the actual introduction of VAT on 1 January 2006, this significant reform aimed primarily at the 
implementation of article I.4 of Annex 4 of the General Framework Agreement (the Constitution of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina), which establishes a single economic space in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
started during 2004, with the unification of customs administrations into the ITA and the shifting of 
customs policy to the State level (World Bank, 2007).  
The ITA, which is based in Banja Luka, functions as an independent administrative body estab-
lished in concurrence with relevant administrative laws and is regulated as the only body in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina primarily responsible for “implementing legal regulations regarding indirect taxa-
tion and policies determined by the Council of Ministers at the proposal of the Board4, as well as for 
the payment and allocation of indirect taxes on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.5 
                                                            
2 Since the completion of this paper, a standing order for fixed coeffcients of allocation has been adopted. However, the 
fragmentation and ineffcieincy and ineffectiveness of the fiscal system in BiH as described through this paper remain 
valid.  
3 Office for Macroeconomic Analysis, Bulletin, no.27, October 2007. 
4 Referring to the Managing Board of the Indirect Tax Authority. 
5 Article 4 of the Law on the Indirect Taxation System in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Official Gazette of BiH“, No. 
44/03 and 52/04). 
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The ITA establishes and maintains the tax accounting and reporting systems needed for monitoring 
indirect tax payments, tax arrears and for tax revenue allocation. Aside from the Central Office in 
Banja Luka the ITA has four regional offices (in Banja Luka, Mostar, Tuzla and Sarajevo) which 
are responsible for managing the customs offices and customs/border terminals within their terri-
torial responsibility. The location and authorities of these branches have been determined based on 
economic principles with the primary aim of ensuring an effective and efficient service to tax pay-
ers and “providing support to the functioning of a unique economic territory in Bosnia and Herze-
govina”.6 
Although legally reporting to the Council of Ministers (CoM) on its activities, the ITA is governed 
by a cross-governmental Managing Board which is responsible for approving the ITA’s budgets, 
internal operational rulebooks and, in general, overseeing the operations and functions of the ITA. 
However, the responsibilities of the Managing Board go beyond operational supervision of the ITA. 
The Managing Board also develops proposals concerning indirect taxation policy for consideration 
by the CoM and it is responsible for resolving disputes in decisions regarding the allocation of indi-
rect tax revenues. The composition and major roles and responsibilities of the Managing Board are 
presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Composition and responsibilities of the ITA Managing Board  
 
 
  
                                                            
6 Article 6 of the Law on the Indirect Taxation System in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Official Gazette of BiH“, No. 
44/03 and 52/04). 
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Article 19 of the Law on the Indirect Taxation System in Bosnia and Herzegovina7 regulates that all 
decisions of the Managing Board must be made by consensus. The Chairman of the Managing 
Board is charged with determining whether consensus has been reached. When deciding on the al-
location of indirect tax revenues, in the absence of a consensus, decisions are made by simple ma-
jority which must include the votes of all three ministers of finance.8  
The organizational structure of the ITA is not bound by entity borders, which makes it a truly Bos-
nia and Herzegovina-wide institution, existing to uphold the indirect taxation system in the entire 
country. On the other hand, the existence of a cross-entity Managing Board ensures that entity in-
terests are not in any way contravened by the fact that the indirect taxes are, in effect, levied, admi-
nistered and collected by the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina level9. However, until recently, due 
to the allocation scheme described in the next section, the Managing Board of the ITA spends the 
smallest proportion of its time analyzing indirect taxation policy and recommending changes to it 
(World Bank, 2007). 
Allocation of Indirect Taxes in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The allocation of indirect taxes in Bosnia and Herzegovina is regulated primarily by the Law on the 
Indirect Taxation System10 and the Law on Payment to the Single Account and Revenue Alloca-
tion11, as well as by a series of related ancillary regulations. Mostly due to opposing political inter-
ests, the fixed percentages for indirect tax allocation to the State, entity and Brčko District govern-
ments was not initially formally regulated. As a result, coefficients for allocation were left to be de-
cided on an ad hoc basis during the meetings of the Managing Board of the ITA. The overall alloca-
tion scheme is presented, in simplified form, in 
                                                            
7 Official Gazette of BiH, No. 44/03 and 52/04. 
8 As explained on the web site of the ITA of BiH, http://www.uino.gov.ba/b/O_nama/Upravni_odbor.html 
9 However, it must be noted that the constitutional framework of BiH a priori prevents any type of unilateralism and any 
circumstance in which entity interests can be contravened (with the exception of decisions imposed by the High Repre-
sentative in accordance to Bonn Authorities).  
10 Official Gazette of BiH, No. 44/03 and 52/04. 
11 Official Gazette of BiH, No. 55/04. 
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Figure 2 below.   
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Figure 2: System of allocation of indirect tax revenues in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
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Table 1: Allocation coefficients between levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the pe-
riod January – December 200712 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
FBiH 64.7967 65.0
5 
65.05 65.05 65.05 64.88 64.58 64.58 64.58 64.58 64.58 64.58 
RS 31.5142 31.5
7 
31.57 31.57 31.57 31.57 31.87 31.87 31.87 31.87 31.87 31.87 
Brčko 
District 
3.6891 3.38 3.38 3.38 3.38 3.55 3.55 3.55 3.55 3.55 3.55 3.55 
Source: Office for Macroeconomic Analysis, Bulletin no. 27, October 2007 
Given the large amounts of indirect taxes in question, even a difference of less than half a percen-
tage point in the allocation coefficients during the year can mean up to hundreds of thousands of 
KM less (or more) of indirect tax revenues between two consecutive months. Bearing this in mind, 
it is no wonder that such heated debates arise around percentages and that so much scrutiny is un-
dertaken of the information about ‘final consumption’ that is reported in tax returns.  
Aside from the obvious dissatisfaction with the amount of revenues that it allows to each of the re-
cipients (which, in all honesty, will always exist in any tax revenue allocation system between le-
vels of government), in terms of revenue planning, it puts the entities and Brčko District in a less 
favorable position than the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina institutions. This is because the State 
institutions are able to estimate their revenue, on a daily basis, more accurately than is the case with 
other recipients.13  
Secondly, it puts a great burden on the ITA to report promptly on returns made to tax payers (which 
are excluded from the revenue amounts subject to allocation), as well as revenue payments due. 
Likewise, given the basis of allocation, the ITA must ensure the accuracy of information from the 
tax returns in order to ensure the validity of tax allocations. As a result, much of the ITA’s time and 
effort is dedicated to verifying the information on tax returns for taxes already paid, rather than en-
suring enforcement of collection of taxes that are due, or tracking taxes that are not even reported.  
Another inadvertent effect of this allocation scheme is that each of the governments has a perverse 
incentive to ensure that spending (public or otherwise) is very much kept within its territorial  
“boundary” given this directly reflects on the amount of the allocation coefficients. This diminishes 
the positive role the indirect tax system is meant to have regarding the creation of a unified econom-
ic space through the unhindered flow of goods, people and capital. Given the high proportion of 
                                                            
12 Through a Decree of the High Representative for BiH, the coefficient for Brčko District is fixed to 3.55, while the 
coefficients for the entities are to be calculated based on the relative proportion of final consumption in both entities. 
This Decree has been in place since 1 June 2007. 
13 The proportion allocated daily to the State of BiH is according to Article 12 of the Law on Payment to the Single Ac-
count and Revenue Allocation (Official Gazette of BiH, No. 55/04) calculated as “the amount approved in the State of 
BiH budget for the current year multiplied by the coefficient derived when 1 is divided by the number of working days 
of the Indirect Tax Authority in the current year”.  
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public spending in the overall GDP, each level of government also maintains an interest in increas-
ing public spending in their localities since this contributes to the increase of the allocation coeffi-
cients. 
Needless to say, the nitpicking that comes about as a result of this allocation scheme diminishes the 
policy role of the Managing Board of the ITA and is a source of high political tension. It places 
large administrative and accounting burdens on the ITA and diminishes overall trust in the system. 
Probably the most “problematic” aspect of the current scheme is that it prevents any of the levels of 
government to look further than the immediate needs of ensuring revenues for financing their budg-
ets and towards a more holistic appraisal of the entire system. The current discussions of the issues 
disregard the very obvious fact that the system is fragmented; with lower level governments (name-
ly cantons and municipalities) explicitly excluded from the allocation schemes determined on the 
State of Bosnia and Herzegovina level. The issue of the allocation of indirect taxes to lower level 
governments is thus left to be regulated in various different ways by their responsive “upper-level” 
governments. Fiscal equalization polices, therefore, are currently not at the forefront of the design 
of the indirect tax system allocation schemes. 
The approaches taken by other federally constituted countries vary. However, most federations that 
do share similar centralized indirect taxes, namely VAT, with other levels of government, do so 
based on fixed coefficients, structured around fiscal equalization considerations that apply to all le-
vels providing public goods and services.  
 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON VAT ALLOCATION 
The decision to centralize the collection and administration of indirect taxes, most prominently 
VAT, in essence goes against conventional wisdom concerning tax assignment in decentralized 
countries or federations (Bird et al, 2001). Retail sales tax (RST), which has been supplanted by 
VAT in most countries, was more often than not the revenue of sub-national governments and 
usually not subject to tax sharing among different levels of government. This was also the case in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the RS, Brčko District and the cantons in the FBiH as the primary 
beneficiaries of the previous RST. 
However, for most federations, such arrangements were no longer feasible under the new VAT tax-
ation regime. Some of the reasons for this stems from the fact that levying VAT on more than one 
basis could have highly distorting economic and fiscal effects and likewise, make administration 
and compliance needlessly costly (Bird et al, 2001). This is why VAT was mostly centralized in de-
veloped federations around the world with varying degrees and methods of revenue-sharing at sub-
national levels of government (see  
 
Table 2).  
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Table 2: Sales tax in Federal Countries (Bird et al, 2001)14 
Country Is there a 
Federal VAT? 
Is there sales tax on 
sub-national levels? 
What is the type of sales tax in the sub-
national governments (SNGs)? 
Germany Yes No SNGs share in VAT revenue 
Austria Yes No SNGs share in VAT revenue 
Switzerland Yes No None 
Belgium Yes No None 
Australia Yes No All VAT revenue goes to SNGs 
Canada Yes Yes Some have VATs, some have RSTs 
United 
States 
No Yes Most have RSTs 
 
It is only for large, territorially dispersed federations, such as Canada, that sub-national value-added 
taxation systems are considered sustainable taxation arrangements15 (Bird et al, 2001). Nonetheless, 
for a country the size of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the initial approach of centralizing indirect taxes 
(a majority relating to VAT) is a sound one. However, as explained in the previous section, the allo-
cation criteria are proving to be very troublesome. It creates larger-than-usual uncertainties in finan-
cial and budgetary planning because it is dependent on negotiations during the fiscal year between 
key political actors. Likewise, as the European Union (EU) is also coming to realize in efforts to 
assign VAT revenues within the EU, if economic cohesion entails obliterating borders within a par-
ticular economic space, it is extremely difficult to determine, in a transparent and fair way, points of 
destination-based final consumption for purposes of VAT allocation (Bird et al, 2001).  
This is why “many have argued that the ’German solution’ of a centralized VAT, with some of the 
revenues shared with the states on a formula basis, is probably the best approach” (Bird et al, 2001). 
With the unification of Germany the formula used for allocating VAT has changed, with the Federal 
government foregoing a larger potion of VAT than was the case before unification. Furthermore, as 
of 2004, the Federal Government is committed to additional supplemental financing of the new 
Eastern Federal states in order to ensure that their standards fall into line with their older Western 
counterparts, at the same time alleviating some of the supplementary financing provided until then 
by the Western states. The fixed percentages used until 2004 to allocate VAT vertically are pre-
sented in Table 3. 
                                                            
14 It must be borne in mind that for most of these countries VAT does not constitute a substantial portion of total tax 
revenues. For most of these countries the “largest” taxes, personal income and profit taxes, are usually exclusive reve-
nues of the federal levels.  
15 However, it must be borne in mind that value-added tax has been difficult to implement in general in North America, 
with the U.S. failing to implement VAT taxes to this day (Bird et al, 2001). 
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Table 3: Allocation of total VAT revenues in Germany in percentages and in order of allocation16 
The 
amount 
in % 
To Whom? At what Stage of 
Allocation? 
Rationale 
5.63% Federal 
Government 
Up Front Because of the contributions by Federal 
Government to the Statutory Pension Scheme 
2.2% Municipalities Before further allocation to 
other levels 
on a per capita basis (implying a strong implicit 
equalization effect) (Spahn, 1995) 
 
50.4%17 Länder After first two allocations Same as previous 
49.6% Federal 
Government 
After first two allocations Same as previous 
 
Under the same scheme, VAT was also allocated horizontally, with 25% of the share of the total 
VAT allocated to the Länder going up-front to those Länder in fiscally weaker positions. Disregard-
ing at this time the specificities of the German allocation scheme and the exact percentages used in 
Germany for allocating VAT revenues, a key feature of this particular allocation scheme is its holis-
tic approach to revenue allocation in order to achieve greater equalization.  
This is attested to by the plain fact that the allocation scheme guarantees a portion of VAT revenues 
to municipalities, regardless of the fact that municipalities are administratively responsible to the 
Länder. Therefore, fiscal equalization, both vertical and horizontal, is the key determinate of the 
allocation scheme. A holistic approach to fiscal equalization is completely lacking in the current 
fiscal system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as is explained in the following section.     
 
Inter-governmental Indirect Tax-Sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Naturally, fiscal relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be observed solely through the prism 
of the indirect taxation system of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although indirect taxes are the only tax-
es shared between the State level, entities and Brčko District, there is further revenue sharing be-
tween the entities and their constituent units. However, the overwhelming majority of total tax rev-
enues for all levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina (over 85% according to 2008 statistics of the Office 
for Macroeconomic Analysis of the ITA) relates to indirect tax revenues.  
For the cumulative tax revenues of FBiH, cantonal and Federation municipal budgets, 84.27%18 in-
clude revenues from indirect taxes, while the same is true for 80.73% of cumulative tax revenues 
                                                            
16 Based on information compiled from the German Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs and 
Spahn, 1995.  
17 These are the percentages for allocation to the Federal and Länder governments of amounts remaining after 5.63% 
and 2.2% have been deducted for Statutory Pension Schemes and to municipalities. 
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for the RS and its municipalities.19 Therefore, given the high proportion these revenues represent in 
total tax revenues, as well as in overall revenues, the allocation scheme of indirect taxes throughout 
the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina is exceptionally important for sustaining vertical and hori-
zontal fiscal balances.20  
Primarily owing to significant donor input21, the FBiH and the RS, have, as of 2006, introduced al-
location schemes for indirect taxes that seem to address the high vertical and horizontal fiscal im-
balances that existed in the tax sharing schemes prior to the implementation of the Bosnia and Her-
zegovina-wide indirect tax system. Box 1 provides a summary overview of the tax-sharing system 
established for indirect taxes for the cantons and municipalities in the FBiH and the municipalities 
in the RS.  
Box 1: Indirect tax-sharing schemes for lower level governments in the FBiH and the RS  
According to the Law on Allocation of Public Revenues in the FBiH22 the Government of the FBiH 
used “for the first time a formula for the distribution of revenues to lower level government” 
(Dervišević, 2006). The revenues from indirect taxes that are allocated in total to the FBiH level are 
further distributed in the following manner:  
-- 36,2 % to the FBiH level;  
-- 51,48 % to the cantonal level; 
-- 8,42 % to the municipal level; 
-- 3,9 % for the Directorate for Roads. 
Five types of criteria (weights) are used for the horizontal allocation between cantons and munici-
palities: 
a) size of territory (6% weight for cantons, 5% for municipalities), 
b) size of population (57% weight for cantons, 68% for municipalities), 
c) number of pupils enrolled in elementary schools (24% weight for cantons, 20% for municipali-
ties), 
d) number of pupils enrolled in secondary schools (applicable only for cantonal levels, 13% weight) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
18 Furthermore, based on information collected by the Ministry of Finance of the FBiH of revenue collected in the pe-
riod January to August 2007, 95.37% of total tax revenues for the Federation level, 83.66% for the cantonal level and 
55.55% for the municipal level relate to indirect taxes.  
19 Based on information of the Office for Macroeconomic Analysis (OMA) of the ITA of the tax revenues collected for 
the first six months of 2007. 
20 Based on OMA information this is 71.69% of total BiH-wide revenues reported by the OMA for first six months of 
2007. Based on information of the Ministry of Finance of the FBiH for the first eight months of 2007 this is 68.62% of 
total reported revenues for the FBiH. 
21 Namely the USAID and Sida funded Governance Accountability Project of BiH.  
22 Official Gazette of the FBiH No. 22/06 
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e) index of development (applicable only for municipalities, 7% weight) which “measures the factor 
of fiscal capacity of municipalities” and is “calculated as the portion of collected sales and profit tax 
for a certain municipality in 2005 in comparison to the FBiH average for these taxes” (Dervišević, 
2006). 
The Law on the Amendments to the Budget System Law of the RS23 allocates vertically the total 
revenues allocated to the RS from the single account of the ITA according to the following percen-
tages: 
-- 73,5 % to the RS level;  
-- 23,0% to the cities and municipalities; 
-- 3,5 % to Public Enterprise “RS Roads”; 
Horizontal allocation between cities and municipalities is carried out based on the following crite-
ria: 
a) 75% based on the size of population; 
b) 3% based on size of territory, 
c) 15% based on number of pupils enrolled in secondary schools; 
d) 5% based on the number of pupils in elementary schools.  
For the FBiH, the current tax-sharing scheme for indirect taxes offer the possibility for an increase 
in the portion of indirect taxes over a certain period for those municipalities and cantons that histor-
ically have had the smallest share of the former RST (Dervišević, 2006). The same is true for muni-
cipalities in the RS.24 Changes introduced in the allocation schemes of indirect taxes resulting from 
the introduction of VAT have, for the first time, presented the concept of objective criteria in inter-
governmental revenue allocation. However, there have been some concerns that the allocation crite-
ria used have not fully taken into consideration the expenditure responsibilities of the cantonal 
and/or municipal governments, which raises questions as to the extent to which fiscal equalization 
has been achieved.  
Another major issue that has arisen in the use of objective criteria is the unreliability of statistical 
data. Both entities relied on the statistics provided by their respective statistical agencies. However, 
overall statistical data gathering is fragmented and statistical methodologies differ. Without reliable 
statistics, the coefficients being used can be subjected to dispute, again leaving the allocation sys-
tem subject to ad hoc, unsystematic negotiations between the levels of government. However, hav-
ing different regimes for tax allocation of the State-level administered indirect taxes still creates po-
tential for extreme fiscal imbalances. It also leaves cantons, and in particular municipalities to be 
vulnerable to, in the best case, fiscal inequalities, and in the worst case, political nepotism. 
                                                            
23 Official Gazette of the RS No. 34/06 
24 See the Decision of the Government of RS on the allocation of indirect taxes to individual municipalities made in 
June 2007. (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 56/07). 
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Similar disproportionate representation of sub-entity levels of government is evident in the structure 
of institutional arrangements for intergovernmental fiscal relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
described in the next section.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELA-
TIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
The Fiscal Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina was tentatively introduced during 2005, mainly at 
the behest of the IMF which was concerned about the lack of formal or institutional mechanisms for 
the coordination of fiscal policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in relation to the size and 
scope of government spending across levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There was a 
brief period of success in holding consecutive meetings of the FC in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
even in the implementation in practice of the recommendations of its meetings (most notably during 
2005). Unfortunately, the change of government in the RS and the 2006 elections brought about a 
complete halt to the workings of the FC in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to initiatives to set it up as 
a legal entity and to determine its role25. The ultimately agreed and adopted Law on the Fiscal 
Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina defined the role and responsibilities of the FC as described in 
Box 226. 
Box 2: Role and Responsibilities of the Fiscal Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
• Coordination of fiscal policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
• Adopting the proposal of the three-year “Global Framework of Fiscal Balance and Policy in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina”, containing proposed fiscal objectives for Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na, entity and Brčko District budgets, proposal of indirect tax macroeconomic projections 
for total indirect taxes and their allocation; and an upper debt limit for Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, entity and Brčko District budgets;  
• Adopting proposal of short-term and long-term macroeconomic projections; 
• Monitoring the implementation of determined objectives and criteria in the execution and 
adoption of budgets; 
• Achieving complete coordination of activities in accordance with agreed budget calendars 
for State, entity and Brčko District governments, 
• Proposing priority measures for enhancing public sector financial management in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina; 
• Adopting all acts necessary for the proper functioning of the Fiscal Council, as well as its 
budget. 
                                                            
25 Although during 2009 and beginning of 2010, the Fiscal Council has started to operate once more.  
26 Article 5 of the Draft Law on the Fiscal Council in Bosni and Hercegovina. 
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The FC in Bosnia and Herzegovina is comprised of representatives of the State and the two entities 
(this time around it is the prime ministers and ministers of finance, with the Governor of the Central 
Bank and President of Brčko District Government acting as observers). It is assumed that coordina-
tion with lower levels of government (cantons and municipalities) will be carried out by the compe-
tent “upper-level” government. If fiscal equalization considerations were to be put at the forefront 
of the indirect tax allocation scheme, the FC in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be the forum in 
which this scheme would be monitored and assessed. In the light of that, the FC in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina would need to expand its membership to include representatives from cantons and muni-
cipalities. There are several arguments for this.  
Firstly, indirect taxes comprise a high proportion of the overall amount of tax revenues within can-
tonal and municipal budgets. This results in a high dependence of cantonal and municipal fiscal po-
sitions on such revenue. This ultimately impacts on the quality of public service delivery in this par-
ticular revenue source. Fiscal balance can only be achieved, therefore, if there is a holistic and 
common set of criteria of revenue allocation encompassing all levels of public service delivery in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Given that indirect taxes are exclusive revenues of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina (regardless 
of the executive and legislative arrangements of the State in general and the specific institutional 
arrangements for the indirect taxation system in particular) the State should have some role in en-
suring that objectives of fiscal equalization and equity and quality in public service delivery are 
met. At the very least, this could be enacted through the representation of cantonal and municipal 
(“lower”) level governments in State-level forums, established for the purpose of negotiating meas-
ures to ensure fiscal policy and balance, i.e. arrangements for indirect taxation allocation.  
In all federations, the central government or centrally-led coordination mechanisms play a signifi-
cant role in closing fiscal gaps, as well as in ensuring a minimum of common standards in public 
service delivery and effectiveness. There is a very simple reason for this. Although federations 
score highly in efficiency compared to more centrally administered countries, these scores do not 
similarly apply when it comes to issues of equity. Devolved decision-making causes federations to 
become prone to inequalities in public service coverage and provision, and in many cases, the most 
vulnerable groups within any society are more disenfranchised than similar groups in more centra-
lized or unitary states (Watts, 1999).  
Despite the institutional arrangement of the indirect tax system in Bosnia and Herzegovina and de-
spite the fact that indirect taxes are shared between the levels of government (i.e. directly between 
the State, entities and Brčko District, and indirectly to the other levels of governments, namely can-
tons and municipalities) indirect taxes collected by the ITA can be considered exclusive revenues of 
the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the CoM, i.e. the State level, is de facto and de jure politi-
cally responsible for raising this particular source of revenue (Bird et al, 2001). Therefore, ensuring 
fiscal equilibrium (in the sense that all levels have the comparable fiscal standing needed to deliver 
the legally mandated public goods and services of each of them), and simultaneously ensuring the 
effectiveness of their spending (particular for areas of strategic importance for overall economic 
growth, such as education) should be a natural role that the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina should 
assume. This would lead to a natural continuation of the reforms implemented thus far in establish-
ing the indirect tax system in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
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In that regard another anomaly of the Bosnia and Herzegovina “federation” that needs to be ad-
dressed when discussing fiscal equalization in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the fact that the State lev-
el of Bosnia and Herzegovina is explicitly precluded from developing any type of transfer scheme 
to sub-national levels of government (entities, Brčko District, cantons or municipalities). The ad-
vantages of well-designed and structured inter-governmental transfers in not only in closing fiscal 
gaps, but also in the achievement of wider national objectives are yet to be recognized (and allowed 
for the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina level) and these should be developed as instruments of fis-
cal policy and fiscal cohesion.  
For federations, transfers are considered an “intrinsic feature” (Boadway, 2007) of intergovernmen-
tal fiscal relations. This is primary due to the inherent tensions within all federations between, on 
one hand, the efficiency that is broadly believed to be derived from decentralizing decision-making 
and, on the other, achieving overarching national objectives “including equality of economic out-
comes, equality of opportunity, and economic security, versions of which are often found in a na-
tion’s constitution” and that is usually the responsibility of sub-national government to deliver, but 
for federal governments to uphold (Boadway, 2007). Transfers are one of the policy instruments 
federal governments usually use to alleviate these tensions (Boadway, 2007). 
In that regard, despite its high level of decentralization (one might even argue an extreme level in 
some cases); Bosnia and Herzegovina does not function as a functional federation. This is simply 
attested to by the fact that the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not provide any forms of trans-
fers to lower level governments. Furthermore, the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have 
any means of securing any forms of cohesion within the country (legislative, fiscal or otherwise). A 
prime reason for this is the “hybrid nature” of the Bosnian-and-Herzegovinan “federation” (FPI 
BiH, 2007) (see 
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Figure 3: Governance arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina against “ideal” types of federal sys-
tems 
 Separate legisla-
tion for federal 
and sub national 
governments 
Strong represen-
tation of sub na-
tional govern-
ments in federal 
legislature 
Little or no har-
monization on tax 
bases and tax 
rates, decentra-
lized tax adminis-
tration 
Fiscal redistribu-
tion between fed-
eral and sub na-
tional levels 
Dual federal sys-
tem with coordi-
nate responsibili-
ties27 
Yes No Yes No (or very li-
mited) 
Cooperative federal 
system with shared 
responsibilities28 
No, federal level 
regulates sub na-
tional level imple-
ments 
Yes No Yes 
Bosnia and Herze-
govina “federal” 
system 
Yes Yes Only indirect taxes 
shared 
No 
Adapted from “Governance Structures in BiH: Capacity, Ownership, EU Integration, functioning State”, FPI BiH 
It is obvious from the table above that BiH is neither a dual nor a cooperative federation, but rather 
a combination of both, making the overall governance structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina highly 
unstable and extremely inefficient (FPI BiH, 2007). This is reflected in the indirect taxation system. 
The fact that it was centralized and assigned to the State level of government is in line with expe-
riences of other federal countries (as explained earlier), however if Bosnia and Herzegovina were 
more of a cooperative federation the allocation of indirect taxes would have been done on a more 
holistic basis, taking into account the fiscal capacities of all levels of government providing public 
goods and services and using assessments based on solid and unified statistical data. On the other 
hand, if Bosnia and Herzegovina were more of a dual system none of the indirect tax revenues 
would be shared with other levels, leaving the resulting fiscal gaps in the lower levels to be resolved 
through transfers from the State level. 
However, transfers in federal governments, aside from equalizing “the fiscal capacities of regional 
governments to provide comparable levels of public services”, also often serve as an “incentive for 
[sub national governments] to design their programs in a way that reflects national norms of effi-
ciency and equity, and encourages them to harmonize their policies” (Boadway, 2007). As stated 
previously no transfers, either conditional or non-conditional, are made from the State to entity or 
lower levels of government. The use of transfers in entities toward lower level governments (can-
tons and municipalities) are primarily regulated through annual budget execution laws and, in ef-
                                                            
27 An example of this type of federal system in Europe is Switzerland. 
28 The German federation comes closest to being an example of this type.  
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fect, are not established as an integral part of overall intergovernmental fiscal relations. Therefore, 
the effects of these transfers in terms of fiscal equalization would need to be systematically assessed 
and designed according to these assessments.  
This is the time that the issue of the un-holistic, disharmonized and ineffective fiscal system in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina can be addressed, as there is no risk of State “dominance” in any of the afore-
mentioned issues. There is a potential for a strong coordination mechanism, namely the Fiscal 
Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that can provide “an intergovernmental forum to achieve con-
sensus on the standard of equalization and objectives”, considered a key positive trait in the design 
of intergovernmental fiscal relations (Shah, 2007). 
With that overarching goal in mind, the options outlined in the following section are structured with 
the aim of eliminating the current weaknesses within the current allocation system of indirect tax 
revenues, yet building upon some of the potential strengths of the overall fiscal system in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  
 
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Option 1: Retaining current arrangements of indirect-tax revenue allocation 
In essence, this option is not simply the status quo. Given that there is political consensus on 
the need for change in the current allocation scheme of indirect tax revenues, some remedial 
action will be taken. Most likely the coefficients will be “fixed”, based on an assessment of 
recent trends in final consumption29. However, the need for an immediate resolution will 
mean that the allocation system will not fundamentally change. The basis of allocation will 
still be the relative portion of final consumption and this could adversely affect the free flow 
of goods and services within Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as contributing, inadvertently, 
towards an increase in government spending. Thus, the allocation of indirect taxes will fail to 
bring about more purposeful cohesion within Bosnia and Herzegovina, and will rather 
contribute to its continued fragmentation and imbalance. 
Option 2: Arrangements based on horizontal and vertical fiscal equalization considerations 
This option would require two substantive changes to the overall allocation system that would 
need to be reflected in respective legislative change. Firstly, a similar allocation scheme, 
based on objective criteria, such as is now used by the entities for allocation to lower level 
governments, would replace the current basis of relative portion of final consumption and 
regulated through State level regulations. Secondly, the FC in Bosnia and Herzegovina would 
assume the role of periodically assessing and deciding on allocation criteria and, thus, would 
have to be expanded to include representatives of cantons and municipalities. They could be 
appointed by the respective entity legislatures, based on the recommendations of the 
associations of local self-governments. However, associations must truly act as advocates of 
                                                            
29 And this has been achieved since the completion of this paper.  
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cantonal and municipal governments and must have the technical capacities to be able to 
engage actively in the discussions of the FC and to act on its collective best interest.30 
Option 3: Arrangements based on fiscal equalization and expenditure efficiency and 
effectiveness considerations  
It is common for federal countries 
to use both revenue-sharing and 
transfers in order to achieve fiscal 
equalization, as well as to secure 
the achievement of objectives 
deemed of national significance. 
Analysis of intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers in other countries indicate that output-based transfers, i.e. transfers conditioned 
against the accomplishment of predetermined performance targets, are the most effective 
forms of transfers (Shah, 2007). The reason for this is that, by this arrangement, funding for 
achieving national objectives is provided for, whilst retaining the flexibility for sub-national 
governments to design spending programs. A similar scheme could be incorporated within the 
indirect taxation allocation arrangement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Objective criteria could 
be used for allocating revenues between levels of government, (similar to the system 
described under option 2), with the addition that a portion of the revenues from indirect taxes 
be “earmarked” for transfers to lower level governments in order to finance high priority 
national reform programs designed to achieve set performance targets.  
 
FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS  
Bearing in mind the very volatile political circumstances currently pertaining in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, stabilization of intergovernmental relations, primarily between State, entity and Brčko Dis-
trict and the rebuilding of trust in the indirect tax system are absolutely imperative at this time.  
Therefore, immediate agreement must be made regarding fixed coefficients of relative portion of 
final consumption by the members of the Managing Board of the ITA. However, this should be seen 
as temporary solution and the following needs to be changed in the overall system of allocation of 
indirect tax revenues:  
• Fiscal equalization, horizontal and vertical, between all levels of government that provide 
public goods and services, must be put at the forefront of the indirect tax-sharing system. In 
                                                            
30 In many developed decentralized and federal countries (such as the Netherlands, Germany and others) “most types of 
institutional intergovernmental arrangements somehow include local government associations as an institutional part-
ner”. This is not without certain key requirements; namely that “(a) the local government associations have the institu-
tional and technical capacity to engage in policy analyses and informed policy dialogues with central government coun-
terparts, and (b) the local government associations are sufficiently representative to be able to credibly speak on behalf 
of all local governments” (Boex et al, 2004). 
 
All federal governments use intergovernmental transfer systems 
to alleviate the tensions within all federations between, on the 
one hand, the efficiency that is broadly believed to be derived 
from decentralizing decision-making and, on the other hand, 
achieving overarching national objectives “including equality of 
economic outcomes, equality of opportunity, and economic secu-
rity, versions of which are often found in a nation’s constitution” 
that are usually under the responsibility of sub-national govern-
ments to deliver against, but of federal governments to uphold 
(Boadway, 2007).  
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the near-term, there must be complete abandonment of allocation based on relative portion 
of final consumption. The objective criteria agreed must be simple and transparent and 
based on uniform and reliable statistical information. As far as is possible, the expenditure 
responsibilities of each of the levels of government must be taken into consideration when 
allocating revenues.  
• The review of and proposals for revenue allocation coefficients thus established must be left 
to the FC. The Managing Board of the ITA must, therefore, be left to assess and advise on 
indirect taxation policy and to oversee the management and functioning of the ITA. The al-
location arrangements of indirect taxes must be comprehensive enough to include cantons 
and municipalities. This entails expanding the membership of the FC to include selected 
members from cantons and municipalities. Associations of local governments should have 
the technical and organizational capacity to represent the interests of local governments. 
• In terms of designing a system of intergovernmental output-based transfers, the State of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina could go forth regardless of the destiny of the indirect tax revenue 
allocation scheme and design such a system from its existing budgetary resources for areas 
that it deems of national importance but over which it has no exclusive authority. The FC (in 
its expanded membership) needs to have a role in assessing and renegotiating the conditio-
nality of these State-level transfers. 
However, there are some major preconditions that need to precede any substantive and meaningful 
change, not only in this segment of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
but in all aspects of governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, these are necessary precondi-
tions for any federal setting (Boadway, 2007). Firstly, there must be “some consensus about the im-
portance of national equity and efficiency objectives” (Boadway, 2007) in relation to the decision-
making independence of sub-national governments. The focus placed on these considerations, in 
effect, creates the fabric and form of society in general. Once these principles have been agreed, the 
federal, or in the Bosnia and Herzegovina context, the State level, must be given the instruments 
and authority to uphold these principles.  
The strength of the State institutions depends on the value society places on issues of equity and 
national (or, in the Bosnia and Herzegovina context, inter-national) solidarity. Just as it is impera-
tive to give an equal institutionalized “voice” to cantons and municipalities in issues of intergo-
vernmental relations, the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be given its “voice” as well. The 
strength of this voice depends on the strength placed on the value of equity and solidarity.  There is 
no “European requirement” in this aspect. It is a judgment call that the political decision-makers 
and the citizens who vote and support them will have to make, and one that will shape the society of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina for future generations.  
Finally, there must be a degree of goodwill and willingness to engage in constructive dialogue and 
to assess all possible options and their implications. Unfortunately, unlike the arrangements that are 
negotiated between federal constituents via constitutions, laws, agreements etc., where there is al-
ways room for valid disagreements and nuances in approaches, there are no nuances when it comes 
to the questions of goodwill and willingness for dialogue. They either exist or they do not. Collec-
tively, as citizens and inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we either want this country to suc-
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ceed as a progressive society or we do not. This paper and the arguments presented therein are 
based on the assumption that there are no issues regarding the existence of such goodwill, but only 
issues of how to channel it into wider and more constructive debate.  
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